Dialetheism/excellent bibliography

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This excellent bibliography is from the Stanford University Encyclopaedia entry on dialetheism

Some Basic Concepts

  • Beall, JC and G. Restall, 2006, Logical Pluralism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Berto, F., 2007, How to Sell a Contradiction. The Logic and Metaphysics of Inconsistency, London: College Publications.
  • Kabay, P., 2010, On the Plenitude of Truth: A Defense of Trivialism, Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing.
  • Priest, G., JC Beall, and B. Armour-Garb (eds.), 2004, The Law of Non-Contradiction. New Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Priest, G., R. Routley, and J. Norman (eds.), 1989, Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent, München: Philosophia Verlag.
  • Wittgenstein, L., 1956, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 3rd edition, 1978.
  • Woods, J., 2003, Paradox and Paraconsistency, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Includes an ample discussion of the dialetheic approach to paraconsistency and its wider outcomes within abstract sciences.)
  • Woods, J., 2005, “Dialectical Considerations on the Logic of Contradiction: Part I”, Logic Journal of the IGPL, 13: 231–60. (A discussion on the methodology needed to conduct non-question-begging disputes on the Law of Non-Contradiction.)

Dialetheism in the History of Philosophy

  • Aristotle, The Complete Works (ed. by J. Barnes), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Deguchi Y., J.L. Garfield and G. Priest, 2008, “The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism”, Philosophy East and West 58: 395–402. (An examination of the dialetheic aspects of Buddhism.)
  • Hegel, G.W.F., 1830, Enzyklopädie der der philosophischen Wissenschaften in Grundrisse, in Werke in zwanzig Bände, hrg. von E. Moldenhauer und K.M. Michel, Bände 8–10, Suhrkamp, 1970; page references are to the English translation, The Encyclopaedia Logic (with the Zusätze), Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991.
  • Hegel, G.W.F., 1831, Wissenschaft der Logik, 1831, vols. 11 and 12 of Gesammelte Werke, in Verbindung mit der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft, hrg. von der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Meiner, 1968ff; page references are to the English translation, Hegel's Science of Logic, New York: Humanity Books, 1969.
  • Cusanus, Nicholas, 1440, Of Learned Ignorance, G. Heron (trans.), London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954.
  • Kant, I., 1781, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1781, vols. 3 and 4 of Gesammelte Schriften, de Gruyter & Co., 1969; page references are to the English translation, Critique of Pure Reason, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
  • Priest, G., 1990, “Dialectic and Dialetheic”, Science and Society, 53: 388–415.
  • Priest, G., 1991, “Was Marx a Dialetheist?”, Science and Society, 54: 468–75.
  • Priest, G., 1995, Beyond the Limits of Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd expanded edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
  • Priest, G., and R. Routley, 1989a, “The History of Paraconsistent Logic”, Chapter 1 of Priest, Routley and Norman, 1989 (above). (An account of dialetheism and paraconsistency in the history of philosophy.)
  • Robinson, T.M., 1987, Heraclitus: Fragments, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
  • Routley, R., 1980, Exploring Meingong's Jungle and Beyond, Canberra: Australian National University.
  • Smart, N., 1964, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy, London: Allen and Unwin.
  • Suzuki, D.T., 1969, The Zen Doctrine of No Mind, London: Rider and Co.
  • Zhuangzi, Wandering on the Way: Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang Tzu, V. H. Mair (trans.), New York: Bantam Books, 1994.

Motivations for Dialetheism

  • Beall, JC, 2009, Spandrels of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Beall, JC, forthcoming, “Finding Tolerance Without Gluts”, Mind.
  • Beall, JC and J. Murzi, forthcoming, “Two Flavors of Curry's Paradox”, Journal of Philosophy.
  • Beall, JC and D. Ripley, forthcoming, “Non-Classical Theories of Truth”, in M. Glanzberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Brady, R., 1989, “The Non-Triviality of Dialectical Set Theory”, in Priest, Routley and Norman (above), pp. 437–71.
  • Colyvan, M., 2009, “Vagueness and Truth”, in H. Dyke (ed.), From Truth to Reality: New Essays in Logic and Metaphysics, Oxford: Routledge, 2009, pp. 29–40.
  • Field, H., 2008, Saving Truth from Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Hyde, D., 1997, “From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts”, Mind, 106: 640–60.
  • Kirkham, R.L., 1992, Theories of Truth. A Critical Introduction, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
  • Kripke, S., 1975,“Outline of a Theory of Truth”, Journal of Philosophy, 72: 690–716. Reprinted in R.M. Martin (ed.), Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 53–81.
  • Martin, R.M., 1967, “Towards a Solution to the Liar Paradox”, Philosophical Review, 76: 279–311.
  • Mortensen, C., 1995, Inconsistent Mathematics, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. (The introduction contains a discussion of dialetheism.)
  • Priest, G., 1987, In Contradiction, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. 2nd expanded edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
  • Priest, G., 2010, “Inclosures, Vagueness, and Self-Reference”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 51: 69–84.
  • Priest, G., and R. Routley, 1989b, “Applications of Paraconsistent Logic”, Chapter 13 of Priest, Routley and Norman, 1989 (above). (Contains some discussion of most of the motivations for dialetheism.)
  • Priest, G., and R. Routley, 1989c, “The Philosophical Significance and Inevitability of Paraconsistency”, Chapter 18 of Priest, Routley and Norman, 1989 (above). (Contains some discussion of most of the motivations for dialetheism.)
  • Restall, G., 2000, An Introduction to Substructural Logics, London-New York: Routledge.
  • Ripley, D., 2012a, “Sorting Out the Sorites”, in K. Tanaka, F. Berto, E. Mares and F. Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications, Dordrecht: Springer, 2012, pp. 327–45.
  • Ripley, D., 2012b, “Paradoxes and Failures of Cut”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91: 139–64. (A nonstandard dialetheic treatment of the Liar which avoids trivialism by restricting the transitivity of entailment.)
  • Routley, R., 1979, “Dialectical Logic, Semantics and Metamathematics”, Erkenntnis, 14: 301–31. (A defence of a dialetheic account of the paradoxes of self-reference.)
  • Routley, R., and R.K. Meyer, 1976, “Dialectical Logic, Classical Logic, and the Consistency of the World”, Studies in Soviet Thought, 16: 1–25. (A classical defence of a dialetheic approach to paraconsistency.)
  • Russell, B., 1903, Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • van Fraassen, B., 1968, “Presuppositions, Implication and Self-Reference”, Journal of Philosophy, 65: 136–51.
  • Varzi, A., 1997, “Inconsistency without Contradiction”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38: 621–39.
  • Weber, Z., 2010a, “A Paraconsistent Model of Vagueness”, Mind, 119: 1026–45.
  • Weber, Z., 2010b, “Extensionality and Restriction in Naive Set Theory”, Studia Logica, 94: 87–104.
  • Weber, Z., 2012, “Notes on Inconsistent Set Theory”, in K. Tanaka, F. Berto, E. Mares and F. Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications (above), pp. 313–25.

Objections to Dialetheism

  • Armour-Garb, B. and J. Woodbridge, 2006, “Dialetheism, Semantic Pathology, and the Open Pair”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84: 395–416. (An objection to dialetheism based on the notion of pathological sentence.)
  • Beall, JC and G. Priest, 2007, “Not so deep inconsistency: a reply to Eklund”, Australasian Journal of Logic, 5: 74–84. (A reply to Eklund 2002).
  • Berto, F., 2006, “Meaning, Metaphysics, and Contradiction”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 43: 283–97.
  • Berto, F., 2012, “How to Rule Out Things with Words”, in G. Restall and G. Russell (eds.), New Waves in Philosophical Logic, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 169–89.
  • Berto, F., forthcoming, “Absolute Contradiction, Dialetheism, and Revenge”, Review of Symbolic Logic.
  • Carrara, M., S. Gaio and E. Martino, 2011, “Can Priest's Dialetheism Avoid Trivialism?”, The Logica Yearbook 2010, London: College Publications, pp. 53–64. (An argument to the effect that dialetheism may entail trivialism in a cumbersome way.)
  • Carrara, M., V. Morato and E. Martino, 2012, “On Dialetheic Entailment”, The Logica Yearbook 2011, London: College Publications, pp. 37–48. (A critique of dialetheism based on entailment in paraconsistent logic.)
  • Denyer, N., 1989, “Dialetheism and Trivialisation”, Mind, 98: 259–63. (A critique of a dialetheic account of the paradoxes of self-reference.)
  • Eklund, 2002, “Deep Inconsistency”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80: 321–31. (Another critique of a dialetheic account of the paradoxes of self-reference.)
  • Irvine, A.D., 1992, “Gaps, Gluts and Paradox”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 18 (Supplementary Volume): 273–99. (A critique of a dialetheic account of the paradoxes of self-reference.)
  • Littman, G., and K. Simmons, 2004, “A Critique of Dialetheism”, in Priest, Beall and Armour-Garb (above), pp. 314–35.
  • McTaggart, J.M.E., 1922, Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Parsons, T., 1990, “True Contradictions”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 20: 335–53. (A critique of a dialetheic account of the paradoxes of self-reference.)
  • Priest, G., 1989, “Denyer's $ Not Backed by Sterling Arguments”, Mind, 98: 265–8. (A reply to Denyer, 1989.)
  • Priest, G., 1995, “Gaps and Gluts: Reply to Parsons”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 25: 57–66. (A reply to Parsons, 1990.)
  • Priest, G., 1998a, “What's So Bad About Contradictions?”, Journal of Philosophy, 95: 410–26. Reprinted in Priest, Beall and Armour-Garb 2004, ch. 1. (A detailed discussion of some modern objections to dialetheism.)
  • Priest, G., 1998b, “To Be and Not to Be: That Is the Answer. On Aristotle on the Law of Non-Contradiction”, Philosophiegeschichte und Logische Analyse, 1: 91–130. Reprinted as Chapter 1 of Priest 2006.
  • Priest, G., 2003, “Inconsistent Arithmetic: Issues Technical and Philosophical”, in V. F. Hendricks and J. Malinowski (eds.), Trends in Logic, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 273–99. Reprinted as Chapter 17 of the 2nd edition of Priest 1987. (A discussion of inconsistent arithmetics, including a reply to Shapiro, 2002.)
  • Priest, G., and T. Smiley, 1993,“Can Contradictions be True?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 68 (Supplement): 17–54. (A debate on the issue of dialetheism.)
  • Restall, G., 1993, “Deviant Logic and the Paradoxes of Self-Reference”, Philosophical Studies, 70: 279–303. (Includes a discussion of Quinean objections to non-classical accounts of negation.)
  • Shapiro, S., 2002, “Incompleteness and Inconsistency”, Mind, 111: 817–32. (A critique of the possibility of inconsistent arithmetic.)
  • Shapiro, S., 2004, “Simple Truth, Contradiction and Consistency”, in Priest, Beall and Armour-Garb (above), pp. 336–54.
  • Zalta, E., 2004, “In Defense of the Law of Non-Contradiction”, in Priest, Beall and Armour-Garb (above), pp. 416–36.
  • Dialetheism and Rationality
  • Beall, JC and M. Colyvan, 2001, “Looking for Contradictions”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79: 564–9. (On the spread of dialetheias in the empirical world).
  • Berto, F., 2008, “Adynaton and Material Exclusion”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86: 165–90.
  • Bremer, M., 2008, “Why and How to Be a Dialetheist”, Studia Philosophica Estonica, 1: 208–27 (A discussion of the conditions on the rational believability of dialetheism).
  • Dutilh Novaes, C., 2008, “Contradiction: the Real Challenge for Paraconsistent Logic”, in In J.Y. Béziau, W. Carnielli, and D. Gabbay (eds.), Handbook of Paraconsistency, London: College Publications. (A specification of the conditions for a non-question-begging debate between dialetheists and supporters of the LNC.)
  • Hume, David, 1748, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, C.W. Hendel (ed.), Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril Company Inc., 1955.
  • Priest, G., 2000a, “Could Everything Be True?”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 189–95. Reprinted as Chapter 3 of Priest 2006.
  • Priest, G., 2006, Doubt Truth to Be a Liar, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Tanaka, K., 2005, “The AGM Theory and Inconsistent Belief Change”, Logique et Analyse, 189: 113–50. (A dialetheic approach to the logic of belief revision.)
  • Themes for Further Research: Dialetheism, Realism and Antirealism
  • Beall, JC, 2000, “On Truthmakers for Negative Truths”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 264–8. (A discussion of the connections between dialetheism, correspondence theory, and negative facts.)
  • Beall, JC, 2004, “True and False – As If”, in Priest, Beall and Armour-Garb (eds.) 2004, 197–216.
  • Berto, F., 2007b, “Is Dialetheism an Idealism?”, Dialectica, 61: 235–63.
  • Grim, P., 2004, “What is a contradiction”, in Priest, Beall and Armour-Garb (eds.) 2004, 49–72.
  • Kroon, F., 2004, “Realism and Dialetheism”, in Priest, Beall and Armour-Garb (eds.) 2004, 245–63.
  • Mares, E., 2004, “Semantic Dialetheism”, in Priest, Beall and Armour-Garb (eds.) 2004, 264–75.
  • Priest, G., 2000b, “Truth and Contradiction”, Philosophical Quarterly, 50: 305–19. Reprinted as Chapter 2 of Priest 2006.
  • Tahko, T., 2009, “The Law of Non-Contradiction as a Metaphysical Principle”, Australasian Journal of Logic, 7, available online. (A defense of the Law of Non-Contradiction as a metaphysical – as opposed to logical or semantic – principle).
  • Woodbridge, R. and B. Armour-Garb, forthcoming, “Semantic Defectiveness and the Liar”, Philosophical Studies.